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I. Introduction 
 
 Between 1998 and the present, more than one million slum dwellers in Delhi have been 
displaced, a period during which the pace of slum demolition has increased starkly. The combined 
number of slum, or jhuggi jhompri (JJ), clusters demolished by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
(MCD) and Delhi Development Authority (DDA) over the five years leading up to 2000 (1995-
1999) rose more than tenfold over the next five years (2000-2004) (Ghertner 2005). This increase is 
the direct outcome of the judiciary’s expanded role in demanding slum clearance. Whereas the 
decision to raze a slum was previously the almost exclusive domain of Delhi's various land-owning 
agencies, in particular the DDA, these wings of government now have little say in determining the 
legal and political status of such settlements. Instead, the primary avenue by which slums are 
demolished today begins when an association of property owners in a locality, called a Resident 
Welfare Association (RWA), files a writ petition requesting the removal of a neighbouring slum, 
proceeds through the court's granting of the RWA’s request, and ends when the land-owning agency 
abides by the court's direction.  
 Whereas recent analyses of the courts’ slum-related decisions have attributed the current 
round of slum demolition to a new anti-poor judicial orientation (see Bhushan 2006; Ramanathan 
2006; Roy 2006), in this paper I seek to identify the legal and technical mechanisms by which court-
issued slum demolitions are actualized. That is, rather than attributing causality to macro “class 
interest”—an anti-poor or neoliberal bias within the judiciary—I will discern the evidentiary 
requirements the courts deem necessary for demonstrating a slum's illegality. I do so by engaging in 
a discourse analysis of both (i) the orders and judgments of the Delhi High Court and Supreme 
Court of India related to slum demolition over the past approximately 25 years, as well as the (ii) 
original civil writ petitions filed in five different cases that directly led to the demolition of a slum in 
Delhi. By highlighting key words and phrases that arise within the proceedings of slum-related cases, 
I set out to show that the basic statement that “slums are illegal” is a very recent juridical discourse, 
despite its widespread circulation in India today. I further argue that proving this statement in the 
courts rests on a less rigorous evidentiary procedure than other types of truth claims: to prove a 
slum's illegality, one must demonstrate that it appears to be a nuisance. I find that the rise of court 
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orders to demolish slums is occurring not simply because the judiciary is suddenly “anti-poor,” but 
rather because of a reinterpretation of nuisance law, the main component of environmental law in 
India (Jain 2005). Nuisance has thus become the key legal term driving slum demolitions and has 
been incredibly influential in resculpting both Delhi's residential geography and how the city's future 
is imagined.   
 While the documents I examine relate primarily to Delhi, rulings in the Supreme Court and 
High Courts establish precedent across the land, thus determining how cases pertaining to slums are 
to be judged in all cities. Therefore, in addition to making a set of specific claims about the 
discursive reconstitution of legality and citizenship in Delhi, I suggest a set of more far-reaching 
implications for Indian urbanism. In particular, I show how the category “nuisance” is 
fundamentally aesthetic, tied to dominant perceptions of acceptable conduct and visual appearance. 
The ability to criminalize, punish, and expel populations (of the poor, informal, migrant, etc.) that do 
not conform to the aesthetic norms of Indian cities—i.e., those that look like nuisances—hence 
presents a new, or at least newly significant, arena for urban struggle in the post-colonial Indian city. 
This is especially the case given the observation that India’s elite have cultivated a “world-class” 
aesthetic that they are using to try to create “bourgeois cities,” largely through the language of 
“environmental improvement” and “beautification” (Baviskar 2005; Chatterjee 2004, 143-4; 
Fernandes 2006, xxii). Building on these studies, I show how the reinterpretation of nuisance law has 
reconstituted the meaning of “public interest,” defining distinctly (bourgeois) private interests as 
public matters and projecting a vision of urban order—i.e., a world-class aesthetic—founded on 
property ownership. Thus, I specifically show how Indian cities’ embourgeoisement is taking place 
not through a simple assertion of elite power, but rather through the more subtle production of a 
new aesthetic ordering of “the public” and its “proper” uses. 
 In section II, I proceed by describing the basis of nuisance law in India, with special emphasis 
on how it was understood and implemented through the 1980s and much of the 1990s. In section 
III, I analyze key rulings in the courts that led to a re-problematization of “the slum” in terms of 
nuisance in the early 2000s. In section IV, I examine a set of recent petitions filed in the Delhi High 
Court praying for the removal of slums to show how the interpretation of nuisance has been used to 
mark informal settlements as polluting and thus illegal. Specifically, I describe how the courts have 
consolidated a “new nuisance discourse” that codifies a “world-class” aesthetic and provides a visual 
basis for removing slums and visible signs of poverty. I conclude in section V by drawing out the 
implications of this “new nuisance discourse” for the future of urban development in India. 
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 II. The foundations of nuisance law 
 
A nuisance is legally defined as “any act, omission, injury, damage, annoyance or offense to 
the sense of sight, smell, hearing or which is or may be dangerous to life or injurious to health or 
property” (Jain 2005, 97). In common law, nuisances are of two types: public and private, where the 
former is an “unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public” and the latter is 
a “substantial and unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land” (Ibid). The primary 
statutes in the Indian legal system that provide channels to redress nuisance are Section 133 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereafter Cr. P.C.) and Section 91 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908. Section 133 Cr. P.C. was written more recently with the intention of providing an 
independent, quick and summary remedy to public nuisance by empowering a magistrate to order its 
removal (Sengar 2007). The nuisances referred to in Section 133 include: obstructions to a public 
place or way, trades or activities hazardous to the surrounding community, flammable substances, 
objects that could fall and cause injury, unfenced excavations or wells, or unconfined and dangerous 
animals.1 Nuisances are thus limited to two categories: (i) objects or possessions, and (ii) actions—
categories that we will re-examine in section III below. 
The landmark case pertaining to slum-related nuisance was decided in 1980 in Ratlam 
Municipal Council vs. Vardichan. In this case, the Ratlam Municipal Council was directed by a 
magistrate, empowered under Section 133 Cr. P.C., to construct and improve drains in a municipal 
ward to eradicate nuisance caused by stagnant, putrid water. Following appeals in the lower and high 
courts, the Supreme Court declared Section 133 Cr. P.C. to be the primary remedial mechanism for 
dealing with public nuisance: “Wherever there is a public nuisance, the presence of Section 133 Cr. 
P.C. must be felt and any contrary opinion is contrary to law.”2 The judge further stated that Section 
133 Cr. P.C. should be the main channel by which courts ensure that municipal bodies carry out 
their duty to provide clean and safe environments for city residents. 
In this judgment, the court also clarified that the municipal authorities and not slum dwellers 
are the party responsible for nuisances arising from slums with inadequate municipal services. The 
judgment explained: “[T]he grievous failure of local authorities to provide the basic amenity of 
public conveniences drives the miserable slum-dwellers to ease in the streets, on the sly for a time, 
                                                 
1 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 133.  
2 AIR 1980 SC 1622. See also, AIR 1979 SC 143, Govind Singh vs. Shanti Sarup. 
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and openly thereafter, because under Nature’s pressure, bashfulness becomes a luxury and dignity a 
difficult art…. [P]roviding drainage systems… cannot be evaded if the municipality is to justify its 
existence.” The removal of public nuisance in slum-related cases, then, is through the application of 
positive technologies (e.g., building drainage systems). That is, instead of removing or disciplining 
those denied adequate sanitation services, government here should operate through positive means 
to manage and mitigate waste and effluent and thus improve the population subjected to the same. 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the Ratlam decision set a precedent for upholding the 
statutory duties of municipal authorities to ensure public health, particularly that of slum residents.3  
In this context, it is useful to examine the character of petitions filed during this same period 
by private RWAs seeking judicial intervention to address slum-related nuisances, the type of petition 
that has become a major instrument of slum demolition today. As an example, take the case of K.K. 
Manchanda vs. the Union of India,4 a matter that appeared before the Delhi High Court regularly 
until 2002 and that became the lead petition in a summary ruling of 63 related slum matters that we 
will discuss in detail in the following section. The petitioner, the Ashok Vihar RWA, submitted that 
residents were aggrieved by the squalid conditions of a vacant piece of land in front of their colony 
that, according to the zonal plan, was supposed to be a “Green Belt-cum-Community Park.” The 
petition states that the primary source of grievance is “public nuisance” and “health hazard” created 
by nearby slum dwellers’ use of this land as an “Open Public Lavatory”: “Adjacent to this Green 
Belt… there are large number of jhuggies and jhompries [huts] situated in the said vicinity…. [and 
that] people residing in these jhuggies… make use of this Public Ground… for easing themselves 
throughout the day [sic].” The petition goes on to say that this has made the lives of the RWA 
residents “miserable” and has “transgressed their right to very living” because “thousand of people 
easing themselves pose such uncultured scene, besides no young girls can dare to come to their own 
balconies throughout the day [because] obnoxious smells pollute the atmosphere [, thus] the entire 
environment is unconducive to public health and morality [sic].”   
The petition thus clearly states that the source of public nuisance faced by the petitioner is 
slum dwellers’ misuse of public land. Yet, because the petition was written in a discursive context 
structured by the Ratlam decision and the strict definition of public nuisance provided above, the 
petition does not target the slum itself, as similar petitions filed a decade later would do. Rather it 
states that the petitioner is aggrieved “Because the inaction on the part of the Respondents [the 
                                                 
3 See, for example, CA No. 1019 of 1992 in the M.P High Court, Dr. K.C. Malhotra vs. State of M.P.  
4 CWP No. 531 of 1990 in the Delhi High Court. 
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Delhi Administration and DDA] has posed various problems like public indecency, public 
immorality, health hazard etc. which the Respondents are statutorily liable to control….” Following 
the norm set forth in the Ratlam decision, the petition thus states that the slum residents are forced 
to ease themselves on public land because “there is no provision of latrines (Public Toilets) for the 
people residing in these jhuggies.” Again, the blame for the public nuisance falls upon the 
authorities, as is clear from the petitioner’s prayer that the court order the authorities to build a 
community toilet near the slum, develop the vacant land into a community park, and control access 
to the park by building a boundary wall. In 1992, the court disposed the petition while ordering the 
respondents to prevent the slum residents from defecating in the park and to build public latrines.  
The problem defined and targeted in this case therefore had nothing to do with the presence 
of the slum or its legal basis; rather, it merely concerned the nuisance-causing activities of this 
community. Furthermore, the courts used nuisance law to provide municipal services to slum 
dwellers. In the following section, we will examine how nuisance has been redefined in such a way 
that this same category of the population gets re-read as themselves a nuisance.  
While cases through the mid-late 1990s continued to rely on the Ratlam decision in dealing 
with slum-derived public nuisances, a new problematization of the slum begins to emerge within 
juridical discourse at the same time, a trend that portends how slums would be seen by the 
beginning of the next decade. This trend begins to surface in B.L. Wadehra vs. the Union of India5, 
a case addressing the problem of inadequate waste disposal in Delhi. Whereas the original petition 
concerned the failure of the MCD to dispose of municipal waste across the city, and whereas the 
final orders directed the MCD to fulfil its statutory duties to “collect and dispose of the waste 
generated from various sources in the city” by increasing the efficiency of waste collection, the 
judgment makes occasional mention of a growing “problem” of the slum. The MCD in particular 
presents slums as a key problem obstructing it from carrying out its duties, stating in its affidavit that 
because of “problems of Jhuggi Jhompri Clusters [and] floating population…, it is not possible to 
give the time schedule regarding the cleaning of Delhi as directed by this Court.” While this type of 
statement does not yet target slums for demolition, it forms the basis on which future decisions 
equating slums with nuisance will rely.  
 
III. Equating slums with nuisance 
 
                                                 
5 1996 2 SCC 594. 
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In 2000, highlighting the need for Delhi to be the “showpiece” of the country, the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Almrita Patel vs. the Union of India6 radically altered the discursive terrain of 
nuisance law. Without mention of the Ratlam decision, this judgment begins where the Wadehra 
case had left off by hauling up the municipal authorities for failing to improve Delhi’s waste disposal 
situation. However, the court here quickly introduces a new problem in addressing this citywide 
nuisance: “when a large number of inhabitants live… in slums with no care for hygiene, the problem 
becomes more complex.” Based on the inherent deficiencies of the slum population, this sentence 
declares, slums are spaces of filth and nuisance, lacking basic concern for health and environment.  
These words set the tone for the following paragraph, wherein the distinction between slums 
and slum-derived waste is blurred:  
 
Instead of ‘slum clearance’ there is ‘slum creation’ in Delhi. This in turn gives rise to 
domestic waste being strewn on open land in and around the slums. This can best be 
controlled… by preventing the growth of slums. The authorities must realize that there is a 
limit to which the population of a city can be increased, without enlarging its size. In 
other words the density of population per square kilometre cannot be allowed to 
increase beyond the sustainable limit. Creation of slums resulting in increase in 
density has to be prevented…. It is the garbage and solid waste generated by these slums 
which require to be dealt with most expeditiously (emphasis added).  
 
And so emerges the new definition of nuisance. Nuisances in the city, it is stated, originate from 
overpopulation and slum growth; not from the government’s failure to provide municipal services or 
low-income housing as guaranteed in the Delhi Master Plan. If we examine the two italicized word 
clusters shown above, we find that this paragraph not only redefines nuisance, but also proposes a 
new solution: “waste generated by these slums” can be dealt with “by preventing the growth of 
slums.” 
The formal definition of nuisance described in Section II included only particular categories 
of objects possessed, or actions performed, by an individual or group, whereas the current 
interpretation includes individuals or groups themselves as possible nuisance categories. This vastly 
expands the range of procedures that can be administered: no longer simply regulating the nuisance-
causing behaviour of individuals, we will find that nuisance law can soon be used to remove 
                                                 
6 2000 2 SCC 679. 
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individuals themselves. Order number six in the same judgment sets the stage for this very strategy 
in future cases: “We direct [the respondent authorities] to take appropriate steps for preventing any 
fresh encroachment or unauthorized occupation of public land for the purpose of dwelling resulting 
in creation of a slum. Further appropriate steps be taken to improve the sanitation in the existing 
slums till they are removed and the land reclaimed” (emphasis added). Here, it is clear that the court sees 
the need to remove all slums to resolve the problem of municipal waste in the city. Thus, within the 
space of a few paragraphs, the strategic implication of nuisance law shifts from a positive technology 
of building municipal infrastructure to a negative and disciplinary technology of elimination and 
displacement. The MCD’s lackadaisical approach to installing public waste bins, the main problem 
raised in the Almrita Patel petition, leads to a court order to eliminate the residential spaces of the 
working poor, and the “polluting poor” discourse is (re-)born.7
The statement “slums are illegal” and reference to slums as “illegal encroachments” gained 
widespread circulation in judicial discourse only after the Supreme Court’s equation of slums with 
nuisance in the early 2000s. If we look back at petitions and court matters filed before the main 
orders from Almrita Patel were issued, for example the Manchanda petition we examined in the 
previous section, there is little to no mention of slums as “illegal encroachments.” Where 
encroachment or misuse was accused, it was buoyed by concrete evidence related to a land use 
violation. Such is not the case with contemporary petitions filed against slums, as we will see in 
section IV.  
While the Almrita Patel judgment inaugurated a key discursive shift regarding slums and 
nuisance and marks a critical break from previous case law, it was a case proceeding before the Chief 
Justice of the Delhi High Court in the early 2000s that gave technical traction to this new discourse 
by designating a program of slum removal capable of re-inscribing Delhi’s landscape according to 
the moral grid of filth and nuisance.  
In 1999, the petitioner in the Manchanda case filed a contempt motion against the municipal 
authorities for failing to improve the environment in its neighbourhood. Prior to the continuation of 
this matter, however, numerous writ petitions “mostly filed by various resident associations of 
colonies alleging that after encroaching the public land, these JJ clusters have been constructed in an 
illegal manner and they are causing nuisance of varied kind for the residents of those areas” 
                                                 
7 Anti-poor environmental discourse has circulated widely in India since colonial times (see Prakash 1999; Prashad 2001; 
Sharan 2006). For a discussion of contemporary bourgeois environmentalism in Delhi, see Baviskar (2003). For 
historical uses of nuisance law to facilitate industrial development, see Anderson (1995) and Rosen (2003). 
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appeared before the court.8 Therefore, the court lumped these 63 related petitions together under 
the lead petitions of Pitampura Sudhar Samiti9 and K.K. Manchanda10 while embarking on the 
stated goal of taking up “the larger issue of removal of unauthorized JJ clusters from public land 
which were in the vicinity of various residential colonies.” Here, we already find a stark contrast with 
the court’s approach to the Manchanda case in the early 1990s. The introductory comments to the 
judgment (hereafter called the Pitampura judgement) issued in September of 2002 clearly enunciate 
the purpose behind bringing these 63 cases together: to rid Delhi of the persistent nuisance of JJ 
clusters. An interim order passed earlier in 2002 justified this goal by invoking the problem of 
overpopulation in controlling slum-related nuisance: “the agencies… have not taken any effective 
steps to check the growth of these jhuggies which are still mushrooming on public land.”  
However, the task of removing the more than a quarter of Delhi’s population living in slums 
required a far more complex assemblage of justificatory argumentation than the simple description 
of their “uncontrolled growth.” This is so because Delhi’s more than one thousand JJ clusters did 
not surreptitiously crop up (like mushrooms) in Delhi’s shady, vacant corners. Rather, they have a 
complex legal and political history that includes formal entitlement to 25% of residential land, only a 
fraction of which they were provided.11 Further, the Delhi Government’s various resettlement 
policies protect slum residents from demolition without compensation. In fact, just months before 
the Pitampura judgment was passed, the Planning Commission published a report explaining Delhi’s 
slum problem as the direct outcome of the DDA’s failure to implement the mandatory 25% housing 
provision for the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS). How then was the court able to flout the 
poor’s legal and regulatory protections in favour of the more recent and seemingly offhand remarks 
of the Almrita Patel judgment?  
The Pitampura judgment begins by discursively dividing “the problem of the slum” into two 
individual dimensions: “One is the removal of JJ clusters and the other is their rehabilitation.” 
Because the second aspect was pending before a different bench of the High Court12 during the 
proceedings of this case, the court here determined to focus on the removal of JJ clusters alone. 
                                                 
8 CWP No. 4215 of 1995 in the Delhi High Court. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See note 5 above. 
11 Although the Delhi Master Plan entitles the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS), the lowest income category 
defined by the state, to 25% of residential land, this population today occupies less than 2% of Delhi land (Batra 2007). 
See Verma (2002), for a discussion of Delhi’s slum population as what she calls “Master Plan implementation backlog.” 
Verma deftly shows how the current slum population is equal in size to the gap between the EWS housing stock the 
DDA was supposed to build according to the Delhi Master Plan 2001 and the DDA’s actual EWS housing provision. 
12 Wazirpur Bartan Nirmata Sangh vs. Union of India and Okhla Factory Owners’ Association vs. Govt. of NCT of 
Delhi, CWP No. 2112 of 2002, 108(2002) DLT 517. 
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Uncoupling Delhi residents’ entitlement to land and right to live in the city from their present place 
of residence was an unprecedented twist in logic. In hindsight, however, this uncoupling appears the 
only way that the courts could simultaneously sustain the position that slums are spaces of filth and 
nuisance and that slum dwellers are entitled to land and livelihood. Once the question of the 
entitlements of the urban poor to public land (i.e., the question of “rehabilitation”) was bracketed 
off,13 the court could easily proceed to summarize the entire history of slum settlement in a single 
sentence: “There is large scale encroachment of public land by the persons who come from other 
States.” That is, slum dwellers are alien, come from “other” places, and deprive the true residents of 
Delhi of what is rightfully theirs. Despite 45 years of the DDA’s existence and a longer history of 
informal settlements in Delhi, the court disregards the messy conditions that led to the development 
of slums14 and declares: “There is no denying the fact that no person has right to encroach public 
land…. [I]t is the statutory duty cast upon the civic authorities… to remove such encroachments.”  
From this text, we see that legality is primarily gauged by the character of a settlement—is it 
on public or private land? Is it a formal or informal colony? The question of a settlement’s legal 
status now ignores (i) the economic and political context that led to the use of public land for 
informal housing, (ii) the fact that residents of these spaces have been de facto formalized by 
receiving various forms of state-issued residence proof (e.g., ration and identity cards, registration 
tokens), and (iii) the DDA’s patent failure to fulfil the statutory housing provisions of the Master 
Plan. Separating the question of entitlement from one’s present residential status, then, does not 
treat these two issues as logically distinct, as the tone of the judgment would suggest. Rather, this 
discursive separation makes accessing one’s housing entitlement incumbent on his current 
settlement status. 
The judgment next briefly acknowledges the second aspect of the slum problem—slum 
dweller’s entitlement to public land—but denies its relevance by referring to the logic of nuisance: 
“No doubt, shelter for every citizen is an imperative of any good government, but there are cleaner 
ways to achieve that goal than converting public property into slum lords’ illegal estates.” “Cleaner” 
is of course the key word in this sentence, here used as if it had a specific legal referent. However, it 
is not clear to which statute this word may be referring. One might think that the legal procedure for 
addressing cleanliness would derive from nuisance law, but the entire judgment makes no reference 
                                                 
13 This logic has been applied to subsequent cases as well. For example, see Federation of Paschim Vihar Group 
Housing Societies vs. MCD, CWP No.17869 of 2005 in the Delhi High Court, order dated October 6, 2005. 
14 During previous cases, judges considered the circumstances leading to the settlement of a slum before passing 
judgments. For example, see Olga Tellis vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, AIR 1986 SC 180, and 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation vs. Nawab Khan and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 152. 
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to section 133 Cr. P.C., the key nuisance statute. Rather, this word, “clean,” derives its effectiveness 
from the dominant discourse of nuisance we have been describing. That is, “cleanliness” becomes a 
symbolic code of settled meaning within judicial discourse, agreed upon without explication of its 
origins or legal foundation.  
If it is not yet clear that the new discourse of nuisance is the primary mechanism of slum 
demolition in the Pitampura case, consider the judgment’s final paragraph before the bench’s orders 
are recorded: 
  
The welfare of the residents of these [RWAs’] colonies is also in the realm of public 
interest which cannot be overlooked. After all, these residential colonies were 
developed first. The slums have been created afterwards which is the cause of nuisance and 
brooding [sic] ground of so many ills. The welfare, health, maintenance of law and 
order, safety and sanitation of these residents cannot be sacrificed and their right 
under Article 21 [of the Indian Constitution] is violated in the name of social justice 
to the slum dwellers. Even if the government and civic authorities move at snails 
pace… for the rehabilitation of these clusters, this is no excuse for continuing them 
at the given places [sic] (emphasis added). 
 
This paragraph provides the logic upon which dozens of JJ clusters would be demolished in the 
subsequent five years. The declaration that slums are “the cause of nuisance” completes the 
discursive reworking of nuisance and establishes a new legal precedent for informal settlements. 
 Let us now examine three components of the Pitampura judgment’s discursive work. First, 
this paragraph divides “the public” into two categories: “normal” residents of formal colonies and 
slum dwellers, the former owning private property and the latter occupying public land. The 
judgment states that because the former category own their property, came “first,” and suffer from 
the nuisance of the latter’s presence, their “right to life” under Article 21 of the Constitution should 
trump the latter’s. This marks a change in the interpretation of rights, away from a framework 
envisioning the even distribution of rights across a population and in favour of a zero-sum 
conception of rights in which the enhancement of one’s well being necessarily detracts from 
another’s. It is in this vein that the judgment defines slum dwellers as a secondary category of 
citizens whose “social justice” becomes actionable only after the fulfilment of the rights of residents 
of formal colonies. 
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This decision reversed the prevalent interpretation of the “right to life” in Article 21 
regarding slum dwellers that was established almost twenty years earlier in Olga Tellis vs. Bombay 
Municipal Corporation.15 Whereas the Olga Tellis judgment emphasized the (alienable) right of the 
working poor to occupy public land to fulfil their livelihood requirements, the interpretation 
advanced in this judgment elevates the quality of life and enjoyment of land for propertied citizens 
over the livelihood of slum dwellers.16 This is the transformation of Article 21 lamented by most 
critical legal studies of slum demolitions (see Bhushan 2006; Ramanathan 2005). However, the 
Pitampura judgment clearly shows that it is only through the new mechanisms of nuisance law that 
this reversal is enacted. That is, the reinterpretation of Article 21 is a legal effect of the new nuisance 
discourse, not its cause. The new construal of Article 21 becomes an implicit and necessary effect of 
this discourse because, once it is established, this discourse inheres a set of assumptions about (i) 
what defines the proper citizens of a city—residents of formal colonies, (ii) who constitutes the 
“public” in whose interest “public interest” is defined—private property owners, and (iii) the 
elements of a “world-class city”—an urban environment that is clean, nuisance-free, and thus slum-
free. Nuisance discourse is so powerful, then, precisely because in performing the simple semiotic 
task of transforming what everyone knows—“slums are dirty”—into the new truth statement that 
“slums are a nuisance,” it simultaneously carries out much deeper ideological work. By rendering the 
statements “slums are illegal” and “slums are nuisances” acceptable, it reorients the terrain of 
citizenship, social justice and access to the city—categories that would typically fall in the domain of 
Article 21. Once these categories have been re-engineered, the reinterpretation of Article 21 
becomes but a logical extension of the new nuisance discourse.  
 The second effect of the new nuisance discourse, which derives from the first, is a blurring 
of the distinction between public and private nuisance. If we return to the above quoted paragraph 
from the Pitampura judgment, it becomes clear that the court is concerned with removing 
impediments to the security and welfare of private colonies. This concern perfectly overlaps with the 
definition of private nuisance provided in section II—a “substantial and unreasonable interference 
with the use or enjoyment of land,” meaning private property. Yet, each of the cases discussed in 
this paper was filed as public interest litigation (PIL), a requirement of which is that the matter 
affects the broader public, not only a private party. Whereas the cases in question are ostensibly 
treated as matters of public nuisance, many of the actual grievances fall under the strict definition of 
                                                 
15 See note 14 and P.G. Gupta vs. State of Gujarat, (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 182.  
16 See Ramanathan (2006) for a discussion of the Olga Tellis case and the interpretation of Article 21 therein. 
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private nuisance; it is thus apparent that the distinction between public and private is breaking down 
in the course of these hearings; or, as Anderson (1992, 17) found in the colonial context, nuisance 
begins to serve as “the coercive arm of property rights,” defending private interest in the name of 
public purpose.17  
 To better grasp the import of the blurring of private and public nuisances taking place 
today—and to understand how it is used to impose a distinctly bourgeois sense of social order over 
public space—let us return to the distinction between “normal” society and slum dwellers, which we 
found above to rest on the variable of property ownership. This was even more categorically stated 
when the High Court distinguished between “those who have scant respect for law and 
unauthorisedly squat on public land” and “citizens who have paid for the land.”18 Once land 
ownership is established as the basis of citizenship as such, the defense of private property becomes 
an elevated concern. That is, when “the public” is defined by its ownership of property—and those 
without private property are excluded from this category—the minimization of private nuisance or 
the defence of private property becomes a matter of public interest. Thus, whereas the first effect of 
this judgment was to divide “the public” into two categories—property-owning citizens and 
others—the second effect is to reinvest “the public” with the attributes of the first of these groups. 
This is nothing less than the juridical embourgeoisement of Delhi, a privatization of the definition of 
public life and interest: the public’s right is to act according to private interest, and private interest is 
what earns one the right of public life (cf. Marx 1844 [1994]). 
 This construal of “the public” has stark implications for the prosecution of nuisance and the 
overall manner in which land use is legally treated because, as Diwan and Rosencranz say in their 
review of environmental case law in India, “The test which has always been found to be useful in 
distinguishing… [whether a nuisance exists or not] is the test of ascertaining the reaction of a 
reasonable person according to the ordinary usage of mankind living in a particular society in respect 
of the thing complained of” (2001, 97). That is, nuisance is defined as conduct that the court 
                                                 
17 Anderson (1992, 15-6) notes of colonial jurisprudence in India: “Propertied groups were able in many instances to 
invoke public nuisance provisions against anyone threatening the value of their property.” However, he found that such 
claims, in which “public nuisance complaints were blatantly driven by private material interest,” “gave rise to some alarm 
in judicial circles” prompting some judges “to issue warnings of abusive or improper litigation” (16). Such litigation was 
dismissed outright in the post-colonial period until approximately 2000, when the defence of private property owners’ 
civic sensibilities (and land values) started to be treated as a matter of public interest. Indeed, contemporary applications 
of nuisance law closely resemble those under British rule, in which nuisance was a category invoked to maintain the 
boundary between native and European, public and private (see also Kaviraj 1998; Legg 2007; Sharan 2006).  
18 Okhla judgment, see note 13. The judgment goes onto say that the former occupy areas of land adjacent to the latter, 
making the latter “inconvenienced”: “An unhygienic condition is created causing pollution and ecological problems. It 
has resulted in almost collapse of Municipal services.” Thus, we come full circle: inadequate municipal services are not 
the cause of nuisance, but rather the outcome according to the new nuisance discourse. 
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determines to be outside the range of what a “reasonable person” would do. Once “a reasonable 
person” and “ordinary usage of mankind” are defined in terms of residents of formal residential 
colonies, who make up less than 25% of Delhi’s population (GNCTD 2004), the conduct of slum 
dwellers can easily be labelled deviant and unreasonable, be it even their mere existence. Whereas the 
Ratlam decision discussed in section II sympathized with the compulsion slum dwellers face to 
defecate in the open, this same act in the current legal environment comes to represent the 
behaviour of a population with “no care for hygiene”;19 a clear affront to urban order; and, as the 
Delhi High Court declared, an impediment to the “building of modern India.”20 This construal of 
legality flows from the view that the protection of private property is a component of public 
nuisance prosecution.  
 Coming to the third effect of the new nuisance discourse, we find that once slum dwellers’ 
lives are defined as outside the normal range of citizen conduct, their access to legal appeal is also 
questioned. For, if they are outside of normal citizenship, then the procedures for administering 
their conduct will also fall outside the normal domain of civil society. It is in this capacity that the 
final order of the Pitampura judgment states: “We may also note that some petitions were filed by 
various occupiers [slum residents] against whom Orders for removal were passed…. Since they are 
encroachments of public land… they have no legal right to maintain such a Petition.” This 
statement militates against the position established by the Supreme Court in 1996: “When an 
encroacher approaches the Court, the Court is required to examine whether the encroacher had any 
right and to what extent he would be given protection and relief.” 21 Here, the possibility that an 
“encroacher” has a “right” to occupy public land is maintained. That is, an encroacher of public land 
is not presumed ex ante to be illegal. However, the definition of citizenship does not extend as far in 
the present context as it did in 1996, for the new discourse of nuisance has adjusted the procedures 
of natural justice.  
Today, as we will see in the next section, slum residents have become objects to be managed 
and disposed of, not citizens with rights. This recalls Chatterjee’s (2004) distinction between “civil 
society”—the privileged domain of citizens wherein rights are defended through law—and “political 
society”—the extra-legal domain through which non-citizens informally negotiate political 
representation and security. Only, whereas Chatterjee describes these as stable categories springing 
from post-colonial state form, the analysis here shows how they are actively produced through 
                                                 
19 See note 7. 
20 CWP No. 6553 of 2000 in the Delhi High Court, order dated February 16, 2001, an order banning open defecation. 
21 See note 15, Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, paragraph 20.  
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struggle over the public/private divide. The contemporary bourgeoisification of Indian cities, then, 
cannot be summarized as a simple oscillation of power from “political society” to “civil society”. 
Rather, we have to trace how the division between these categories is maintained and given meaning 
through the mechanisms of law and state.  
 
Section IV. Nuisance discourse as mechanism 
 
The previous section tracked the emergence of what I have been calling the “new nuisance 
discourse” and how it has recalibrated the factors used to determine a settlement’s legality. In this 
section I will show how petitioners’ invocation of slum illegality along the parameters of nuisance 
has become an effective mechanism of removing slums. Specifically, by submitting petitions against 
slums as nuisances, petitioners are able to bypass typical eviction procedures. Here, I analyze the 
factors that drive this nuisance-based demolition mechanism by examining five civil writ petitions 
filed in the Delhi High Court,22 each of which uses the new nuisance discourse, was filed by an 
RWA, and led to a slum demolition in the mid-2000s. To understand how the new nuisance 
discourse is activated, I begin by briefly identifying discursive devices—turns of phrase producing a 
specific effect—common across the petitions. These reveal the patterns by which “nuisance” gets 
identified empirically and is summoned as a key term that transforms the identification of “slums as 
dirty” into the legal claim that “slums are nuisances.”  
The first discursive device used by all five petitions is reference to slums as a problem of 
overpopulation: “the area has virtually turned into a slum and the illegal and unauthorized 
encroachments has not only double, tripled over the years but has attained mammoth proportions 
and is threatening to burst at its seams [sic].”23 The words “bursting”, “infesting”, “infectious” or 
“mushrooming” are invariably used to evoke neo-Malthusian fears that the poor’s mere presence 
will endanger the welfare of society at large: “The slum dwellers are living in highly infectious and 
contagious conditions thus exposing themselves as well as the residents of the society to 
epidemics.”24 Three of the petitions goes so far as to dehumanize slums by using the word “slum” 
not as a noun, but an adjective. Slums are then not places in this discourse; “slum” is a condition or 
a disease that infects certain spaces and must be eliminated, lest it spread to purer places. One 
                                                 
22 CWP Nos. 593 of 2002, K-Block Vikas Puri RWA vs. MCD; 6160 of 2003, Maloy Krishna Dhar vs. Govt. of NCT 
Delhi; 8556 of 2005, Kailash Fraternity vs. Govt. of NCT Delhi; 3494 of 2006, Pawan Kumar vs. MCD; and 9358 of 
2006, Jangpura RWA vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi. 
23 CWP No. 593 of 2002. 
24 CWP No. 9358 of 2006.  
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concrete discursive device that plays upon this fear of “society” becoming slumified is the emphasis 
in four of the petitions on the special problem of slum dwellers’ open defecation; two of the 
petitions go so far as to include photographs of residents “caught in the act”: “these people defecate 
in the open creating ghastly scenes and spreading foul smell and infection.”25 Overall, the 
overpopulation device is used to show the un-civic conduct of slum dwellers and the importance of 
removing them to maintain Delhi’s “world-class” image.26
The second discursive device shared by all five petitions is the description of the dual 
categories of citizenship explored in section III: one, rightful, tax-paying citizens who live in formal 
colonies and the other, unlawful residents of slums. Four of the petitions bolster this viewpoint by 
explicitly relying on the interpretation of Article 21 that prioritizes private property owners over all 
others (see section III). Further alluding to the second-class status of slum dwellers, four of the 
petitions describe formally non-evictable actions like slum dwellers’ un-metered use of electricity or 
hosting of “mass celebrations” that deprive RWA residents of resources and “tranquillity” as a 
justification for slum removal. Three of the five petitions also argue that slum dwellers are alien by 
citing the presence of “anti-social” or “criminal” elements and people of “Bangladeshi origin” in 
slums.  
These common discursive devices reveal the petitioners’ middle class anxieties over urban 
environmental order, but more importantly show the channels by which slums are equated with 
nuisance in contemporary petitions. However, to see how “nuisance,” once established, gets 
calibrated to a legal framework that requires slum demolition, let us look at the basis on which 
illegality is adduced in the petitions.  
Each of the five petitions makes reference to “illegal slums” or describes 
“illegal/unauthorized encroachers” more often than it provides any specific details or discussion of 
what makes the slum in question illegal. None of the petitions state an explicit statutory basis for 
eviction. So, although “illegal” is used as if it was a precise term, it does not actually carry any 
statutory precision. Therefore, to determine what these petitions infer when they describe slum 
illegality, I conducted a line-by-line analysis by marking lines in the petitions’ text based on the 
justification they provide for requesting demolition. Because the primary statutory basis on which 
slums can be, and historically have been, demolished is their violation of land use codes, I tracked 
lines in the petitions that make explicit mention of land use as a basis for the petitioner’s demolition 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 The courts’ reference to Delhi as a “showpiece”, “heritage”, “world-class” and “show window” city are widespread 
since the early 2000s, showing the importance the judiciary places on the outward, aesthetic appearance of the city. 
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request. The second category I tracked consists of lines referring to the slum as a nuisance. Before 
presenting the results from this analysis, let me clarify that the argument here is not that nuisance is 
the only basis for slum demolitions cited in the courts today.27 The land use category of the land on 
which slums are settled continues to play a role in slum demolition cases. However, petitions 
targeting slums for land use violations were filed regularly before the current round of slum 
demolitions. What is new and dominant about current juridical discourse about slums is the import 
accorded to nuisance.  
In the five petitions analyzed, lines referring to land use as the basis for demolition appeared 
139 times, whereas lines referring to slums-as-nuisance appeared 346 times, or two and a half times 
more frequently. In all of the petitions, nuisance-based lines appeared at least fifty percent more 
frequently than land use-based lines. This shows that these petitions rely most forcefully on 
nuisance-based argumentation for declaring slums illegal. We can therefore say that the declaration 
of slums as a nuisance performs their illegality, and conversely, declaring slums illegal presumes their 
ontological status as a nuisance.  
Related to the treatment of “slum illegality” as an ontological given is the petitions’ extensive 
use of photographs showing slums-as-nuisances. These images appear in the petitions’ annexures and 
show both the presence of the slum and what the petitioner considers ill effects of the slum’s 
presence: accumulated trash, standing water, open defecation, etc. The manner in which these 
images are described makes it clear that the petitioner expects the court to agree that the photos 
demonstrate a need to remove the slum: “The acuteness of the situation can [be] seen clearly from 
the photographs of the affected area.”28 All of the petitions’ bold, dehumanizing claims about slums 
as spaces of filth are given moral license upon the presentation of a few photographs. It is useful to 
note here that the Manchanda petition examined in section II, which was submitted prior to the rise 
of the new nuisance discourse, did not include such photographs. This type of depiction therefore 
appears as a new visual technology that puts the bench in a position to see slums and slum-derived 
nuisance as one in the same.  
The power of this technology is revealed in the case of R.L. Kaushal vs. Lt. Governor of 
Delhi, the petition for which differs from the five nuisance discourse-based petitions examined here 
in that it neither prays for the removal of a slum nor uses any of the above discursive devices. This 
petition was submitted “for better civic amenities and for nuisance caused by open wide drain 
                                                 
27 Likewise, nuisance-based petitions are not the only type used to target slums.  
28 CWP No. 6160 of 2003. 
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[sic]”29, but does not make a single mention of a slum. Only in the petition’s annexures containing 
letters to elected representatives and photos of the drain is it revealed that a slum exists beside the 
drain. Nonetheless, the court, noticing the slum’s presence in the photos,30 ordered its demolition 
without inquiring into the details of the settlement’s size, location, history, or legal basis.  
Each of the five petitions examined here was met with a positive response by the Delhi High 
Court, which not only ordered the neighbouring slums to be cleared, but in many cases also adopted 
the language of nuisance. As the court stated in an interim order in the Vikas Puri case: 
 
The encroachment has not been removed and it is this lackluster approach of the 
DDA which has resulted in unscrupulous elements to make encroachment on 
government land…. [W]e only observe that on the one hand a citizen has to pay 
handsome price for acquiring land… for his habitat and on the other hand 
unauthorized encroachment and habitat on government land is allowed to go on, 
[which]… deprives the rights of citizens of Delhi to water, electricity and other 
civic services. The right of honest citizens in this regard cannot be made 
subservient to the right of encroachers [sic].31  
 
Here, we see the same process of dehumanization found in the RWAs’ petitions repeated by the 
bench: slum residents are called “unscrupulous elements,” whereas RWA members are called 
“citizens.” And, in constructing the second sentence quoted above in the passive voice (i.e., without 
a subject), the court completely erases the slum subject from the order. This makes the solution to 
the “problem of the slum” appear purely technical, despite its deeply ethical and political nature. In 
reiterating the reasons for needing to remove the entire slum in question, the order further states: 
 
We have seen from the photographs filed as to how illegal electric connections 
have been taken, the Delhi Vidyut Board has been used as a junk yard, service 
lane has been completely blocked [by carts and supplies], the encroachment 
has been made on road and footpath…. The whole area has been converted 
into a garbage landfill. No legal right is vested in the encroachers [sic].32
                                                 
29 CWP No. 1869 of 2003 in Delhi High Court, order dated November 14, 2003. 
30 Ibid. 
31 CWP No. 593 of 2002, order dated March 8, 2006. 
32 Ibid. 
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 Here, with the exception of “the encroachment… on road and footpath”, none of these activities 
statutorily permit the removal of the slum. The huts built on the roads and footpaths, as shown in 
the drawing submitted by the petitioner, made up less than ten percent of the total area of the slum 
and were the most recently constructed. However, the court lumped the entire settlement together 
in passing its demolition order. The court’s other observations here must then constitute the only 
reasons for clearing the entire settlement. On what basis do these activities—i.e., illegal electricity 
use, blocking a service lane with carts, and using vacant land for dumping garbage and scrap 
material33—add up to a demolition notice? “Illegal electric connections,” according to the Electricity 
Act, 2003, require imposing a fine. The remaining activities are nuisances whose removal is governed 
by Section 133 Cr. P.C., which nowhere states that the party responsible for a nuisance is to be 
displaced. However, nuisance law today clearly has new legal and moral coordinates. 
 
____________________ 
 The overall thrust of these five petitions shows that nuisance has today become the 
predominant discursive justification for slum demolitions, even when a land use violation is also 
identified. Further, even in the absence of petitions that specifically target slums for demolition, like 
the Kaushal petition just described, the courts themselves have taken up the task of identifying 
slums-as-nuisances and ordering their removal. This pattern emerged in the proceedings leading up 
to the demolition of the Yamuna Pushta, a slum housing more than 150,000 people on the banks of 
the Yamuna River. In a March, 2003 order in the Okhla case, the bench arbitrarily took cognizance 
of the problem of pollution in the Yamuna River, despite the lack of any mention of the issue in the 
original petition. While referring to other causes of pollution, the bench quickly identified the true 
source of the problem: “In view of the encroachment and construction of jhuggies in the Yamuna  
Bed and its embankment with no drainage facility, sewerage water and other filth is discharged in 
Yamuna water [sic].”34 In the total absence of any evidence demonstrating the Pushta settlement’s 
contribution to the Yamuna’s pollution levels, the court passed its demolition order. After these 
orders were passed, the court continued to target slums as the primary source of Yamuna pollution 
by launching its own suo moto case.35 And, like the RWA petitions we just examined, the most 
                                                 
33 There is no indication that the slum residents alone were to blame for the improper garbage disposal.  
34 See note 13, order dated March 3, 2003. 
35 CWP No. 689 of 2004, The court on its own motion vs. Union of India.  
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“scientific” evidence presented in this case was a series of photographs prepared by the Ministry of 
Tourism ostensibly showing slum dwellers as “polluters.”36  
 While the final judgment in this case does refer to the fact that Pushta existed on the 
Yamuna floodplain and thus violates the layout plan for the area, a handful of other developments 
with a different, what we might call “world-class,” “look” than Pushta—including the Akshardam 
Temple (the world’s largest and most “modern” Hindu monument), the Commonwealth Games 
Village, an IT park, and a Delhi Metro Rail depot—similarly fall on the floodplain. That the court 
targeted Pushta and ignored these developments proves that the nuisance logic formed the strongest 
basis for the demolition. 
 Closing with the Pushta case is useful because it neatly captures key characteristics of how 
nuisance has altered the terrain of judicial argumentation pertaining to slums. This case shows that 
the courts do not have anything close to what could be called a sound calculative basis for assessing 
whether a slum is a nuisance or not. Rather, if a slum appears to be polluting or filthy, based on a 
judge’s subjective view of acceptable, “clean” conduct, then the slum is deemed polluting, a 
nuisance, and therefore illegal. This, as I will conclude by arguing, shows the extent to which today’s 
planning decisions are primarily aesthetic.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The goal of this paper has been to move the conceptualization of Delhi’s current slum 
demolition drive away from the abstract discussion of “anti-poor” or “neoliberal” courts and into 
the concrete domain of legal mechanisms and argumentation. Stating that the right to life under 
Article 21 of the Constitution is no longer interpreted in the pro-poor tradition of the past provides 
little insight into the actual legal means by which slum demolitions are carried out. The argument put 
forth here is that a discursive regime does not change based simply on a new outlook by judges or 
the entry of a new type of petition. Rather, such a drastic reorientation of juridical discourse requires 
an altogether new set of problems, a redefinition of terms, and a re-engineering of legal procedure 
and evidentiary practice. That is to say, rather than seeing the weakening of the right to life in recent 
court decisions as the cause of slum demolition, it might be more useful to see this weakening as the 
effect of a whole series of prior contestations across India over the meaning of citizenship, the 
                                                 
36 In contrast, research by the non-governmental organization the Hazards Centre (Roy 2004) found that Pushta 
contributed only 0.33% of total sewage released into the Yamuna. 
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correct land disposition, and the vision of the city. Here, I have shown that the reinterpretation of 
nuisance law has been the key mechanism by which these contestations were, first, carried forward 
and, second, discursively justified by constructing the truth that “slums are nuisances.”  
 As we saw above, the discursive portrayal of slums as nuisances is radically transfiguring 
Delhi’s physical landscape and political economy.37 It is enforcing a private property regime that has 
never before existed and redefining the terms of access to the city through the construction of 
property-based citizenship (cf. Roy 2003). This conclusion has serious implications for the future of 
Delhi and Indian urbanism more generally and might be used to more broadly explore 
contemporary processes of urban change in India. For one, discourse depicting Delhi (or other 
Indian cities) as an aspiring “world-class” city has been little analyzed to date. Yet, the coordinates of 
the moral grid created by the new nuisance discourse closely align with the vision of a world-class 
city. That is, spaces that appear polluting or unattractive—which unfavourably represent Delhi in its 
“world-class” pursuits—are being criminalized and cleared via nuisance law, even in the absence of 
accurate information about those spaces. Alternatively, developments that have the “world-class” 
look (e.g., the Commonwealth Games Village), despite violating zoning or building byelaws, are 
granted amnesty and heralded as monuments of modernity.38 Returning to one of the formal 
definitions of nuisance laid out in section II—“any… offense to the sense of sight, smell, or 
hearing”—we see that “nuisance” could be broadly construed as anything aesthetically displeasing. In the 
context of cities driven by an elite aspiration for “world-class” status and in which the economy of 
appearances is of elevated importance, has nuisance become the legal foundation for a new aesthetic 
hegemony?  
 Recent studies of Indian cities in the post-reform (1991-) period posit that a bourgeois, 
consumerist, and globalist aesthetic is responsible for the rapid remaking of the Indian urban (e.g., 
Chatterjee 2004; Fernandes 2004). These works often presume that the constitution of a new elite—
the “new Indian middle class”—in and of itself explains the consolidation of such a “world-class” 
aesthetic.39 The mushrooming of malls, commercial complexes, flyovers, gated communities, and 
designated infrastructure—and the concomitant demolition of slums, expulsion of hawkers and 
vendors, and banishment of industry—is simply the supply to the “new middle class’s” rising 
                                                 
37 The same process is underway outside of Delhi too. For an example from Calcutta, see Chatterjee (2004: 60). 
38 Numerous other examples of the DDA and courts allowing blatant land use violations for capital intensive 
development can be cited, including—perhaps most famously—the construction on Delhi’s protected “ridge area” of 
India’s largest shopping mall complex in Vasant Kunj.  
39 As Chatterjee says, “I suspect, however, that the idea of what a city should be and look like has now been deeply 
influenced by this post-industrial global image everywhere among the urban middle classes in India” (2004, 143).  
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demand. “World-class” discourse, here, is described as powerful, without showing how it derives 
and consolidates its power. While descriptions of the aspirations and political goals of the middle 
class are useful, we should not confuse a class’s political goals with its strategy, nor the ideology of a 
class with the institutional mechanisms by which its ideological position is consolidated. In other 
words, in asking what the forces remaking Indian cities today are, our conclusion should not be the 
political aspirations or urban visions of the elite. This tells us very little about how change occurs. 
Instead, we have to show the specific political mechanisms through which these goals get translated 
into real outcomes. In this paper I have examined how the law has codified middle class aesthetic 
norms, giving them material leverage over urban space. The new nuisance discourse, as a 
concretized inflection of bourgeois aesthetics, has given propertied residents of cities increasing 
power over the lives of the non-propertied, threatening to destroy the last vestiges of planned, 
integrated, and socialistic urban planning and, perhaps more importantly, public space. 
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